Moderating Religious Identity and the Eclipse of Religious Wisdoms: Lessons from Hans Frei

Dr. Ben Fulford is Senior Lecturer in Systematic Theology at the University of Chester in the U.K., where he has taught since 2012. He is the author of *Divine Eloquence and Human Transformation: Rethinking Scripture and History through Gregory of Nazianzus and Hans Frei* (Fortress Press, 2013). He is currently working on a monograph on the Frei's theology and social ethics and writing on topics in the theology of marriage and theological anthropology.

The multivalent binary distinction between radical and moderate religion plays a key part in the rhetoric and strategy of European governments in their attempts to produce European Muslim citizens whose primary political loyalty lies with the society and state in which they live. It also plays a key part in public discourse about European Muslims and their citizenship. In what follows, I focus especially on one relatively constructive use of the distinction in the UK, offer an account of its logic through a reading of the political theology of John Locke and a critique of its effects upon a religious tradition that draws on the analysis of Hans W. Frei. Frei's account suggests that to the extent that this logic has shaped Christian self-understanding, it tends to eclipse the wellsprings of the critically constructive engagement of Christians in the public sphere and public institutions constitutive of a pluralist, democratic society. This assessment in turn raises questions about the impact of the moderate/radical binary in respect of sources of constructive critical engagement by citizens with other religious identities.

Moderate Muslims in British political and public discourse

Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Tyler Golson (2007) trace the ways in which European governments, in response to the attack on New York on 9/11 and subsequent attacks on several European cities, revised their policies toward their minority Muslim populations. Those responses converged on a common strategy: alongside long-standing policies of integration, they sought to make the state the 'arbiter and chief architect of a "moderate" European Islam' (Haddad and Golson 2007, 488). Against a background of growing public concern about the threat said to be posed by transnational Islam to Western societies, they aimed to sever Muslims' transnational ties and fashion 'loyal Muslim citizens that share European values' (Haddad and Golson 2007, 488, 498).'[1] In this context certain terms, deployed in the attempt to shape European Islam, attract particular resentment: 'Underlying the very public Muslim condemnations of state policy lies a perception that the state is trying to manipulate Muslims and destroy their Islamic identity by means of sowing dissent in the guise of "integration," "moderation," and "cooperation"' (Haddad and Golson 2007, 513). It is not only governments, however, who use such language. Similar usages are easily documented in the media. In consequence, as Safraz Mansoor (2015) relates of his interviewees, Muslims will use the term 'moderate' to distance themselves from the perpetrators of attacks in the name of Islam – as one would expect, given its force and currency. However, their usage does not necessarily match the government's, where 'moderate' denotes an adherence to certain liberal values such as belief in freedom of expression and acceptance of equality in gender and sexuality. They resent, moreover, its implication, that a moderate Muslim 'is someone who is not especially devout.' To them, it is as though Muslims had to choose between association with violent extremism as the

concomitant of integrity and intensity of religious commitment, and an acceptable, secular identity as the accompaniment of a diminished degree of religious devotion.

The moderate/radical binary is amenable to a plurality of uses. Minority groups within Muslim populations in Europe use it to define themselves favorably as moderates over against Sunni communities whom they represent as evincing radicalizing tendencies (Scharbrodt 2011). Nor is the binary always used, as it is in France, to police a public/private boundary that confines religious expression to the latter sphere (see Marvelli 2012, 160-1). For example, British Governments, commentators and Muslims organizations have used the moderate label, and/or associated terms and values to more constructively to legitimate the participation of Muslim charities and representative bodies in civil society – and to give them space to articulate religious reasons for that participation. This move appears to be part of a broader shift of policy. The British Coalition Government signaled recognition of some of the problems identified by Haddad and Golson in its Review of the Prevent Strategy (Home Office 2011).[2] David Cameron's Munich Speech in that same year recognized and repudiated the distinction between moderate and extremist Muslims. Furthermore, that Government's now much-derided Big Society initiative seemed to offer the opportunity for a more constructive strategy in the framing of European Muslim identity in public policy in terms of the moderate/extremist binary, modulating the traditional emphasis on integration to complement a revised securitization of Muslims.

Jamie Bartlett and Jonathan Birdwell, writing for the think-tank Demos in 2010, recognized this opportunity. Their report, *From Security to Citizens*, retains the extremist/moderate distinction. The terms 'extremism' and 'violent extremism' recur throughout the report and they contrast extremist with moderate movements (Bartlett and Birdwell 2010, 19, 21). Amongst their recommendations, however, was the suggestion that extremism (as distinct from violent extremism) was best countered by fostering community cohesion. Community cohesion, they argued, should inspire and encourage people to become active citizens who imagine a shared future with those different from themselves. It would also build resilience to violent extremist ideologies. The vision of the Big Society, thus, would best address the cause of violent extremism (see also Bartlett 2010). Political and social protest and activism offered an alternative to extremism, a kind of safety valve, Bartlett argued in a Guardian Comment piece (2010). The Home Office's *Prevent Strategy* review proposed ceasing Prevent funding for integration projects, but acknowledged that counter-terrorism depends on 'a successful integration strategy' (Home Office 2011, 3.1.4) because communities which do not participate in civic society tend to be more vulnerable to radicalization (Home Office 2011, 6.20-1, 30) (Home Office 2011, 6, 27, 30).

Indeed, the rhetoric of the Big Society with its embrace of faith-based provision, combined with the gaps in welfare provision created by austerity policies (and with government cooperation with charitable organizations to provide public services), have created a space in which faith groups can participate actively in civil society, and present a religious rationale for their contribution to the building of society or the Common Good. This more constructive approach, then, offers a less polarizing kind of discipline of religious identities to the one I first described. Here authentic religion is moderate in its devotion, but not secular.

This second approach aims to foster the integration of communities in British society and their participation in civic society as a way of making them more resilient to radicalization. Implicit in this account is the retention of a moderate/radical binary. The *Prevent Strategy* report opposes extremist, radical organizations which oppose universal human rights, equality before the law, democracy and full participation in society (and sanction the use of violence) to integrated communities with 'legitimate religious belief' which adhere to those values (2011, 1, 5-6). It states that the policy should afford to 'interested organizations, from the student arena to the worlds of business and politics, with an opportunity they should welcome

to declare unequivocally that they oppose extremism and all its consequences' (2011, 4). David Cameron's Munich speech distinguishes authentic, peaceful Islam as compatible with democracy from the warped, violent political ideology of Islamism and from Islamic extremism (2011). Islamism, he contends, aims at an Islamic realm and Islamic extremism is defined by its hostility to Western democracy and liberal values. Thus this second strategy still defines good and bad Islam essentially in terms of conformity or threat to liberal democracy. It maintains the pressure on religious groups to identify themselves in these same terms and to moderate the public character of their religion and its civic participation accordingly. In this way, it frames moderate religious identity as authentically religious, yet defines authentic religion in terms of its compatibility with an account of British citizenship and national values.

John Locke and the moderation of religion

This approach to moderating religious identities and their public expression has a history. Haddad and Golson point out that the various governmental policies toward European Muslim minorities follow, in a drastically accelerated way, the different patterns of relations whereby European states gradually and painfully domesticated Christianity and Judaism over several centuries of modernization (2007, 513). John Locke's account of toleration has been particularly influential in this process in British and North American contexts, and displays well the logic of this version of the moderate/radical binary. My reading of Locke takes its cues from recent studies by Judd Owen (2014) and Elizabeth Pritchard (2013).

Locke's argument in the *Letter on Toleration*, first published in 1689, is illumined by the political theology of his *Second Treatise on Government*, published in the same year. As Pritchard notes (2013, 61), Locke's political theology is grounded in natural law, the basis of which is God. That law is reason, which teaches that no-one has the right to harm another in life, health, liberty or property since all are God's workmanship and property, of which God alone may dispose (Locke 1988, 271). Hence, we are bound to preserve ourselves and – insofar as this is consistent with self-preservation – the rest of humanity and to not impair what tends to its preservation. Hence also all we have the right to restrain or destroy those who invade others' rights, and to reparation in satisfaction of those losses and injuries they inflict upon us. This right we give over to Civil Government to preclude the chaos of everyone judging their own affairs and the possibility of endless war without the possibility of arbitration (1988, 275-6). Reason also teaches, and Revelation concurs, that God gave the world to humans for their use and enjoyment (1988, 285-6), and in particular to the 'industrious and rational', to improve it (1988, 291). On this basis, we can appropriate natural resources by extending that ownership we have of ourselves to other non-human things by mixing them with our labor, which is our property in action, as it were (1988, 287-8, 292).

Locke firmly separates religion from the regulation of human earthly self-preservation, security and flourishing, founded on such rights, in the *Letter Concerning Toleration.* Care of the commonwealth is the business of the magistrate, and is the proper subject of the magistrate's coercive power for the upholding of the laws that preserve this-worldly goods of life, liberty, health and possessions (Locke 1983, 26-7). The magistrate's power jurisdiction does not extend to religion, however. For religious societies have a different focus – the care of souls, the worship of God for acquiring eternal life – and membership of them is voluntary (1983, 28-30). Church discipline, which rests on common consent alone, is ordered to this end. The power of religious societies is of a different kind from that of the magistrate: it is the power of persuasion, in the performance of a spiritual duty of care through exhortation and argument. As Elizabeth Pritchard points out (2013), religion for Locke is public but how to

worship is a matter of individual choice – like fashion, to which Locke compares differences over worship – a choice which cannot be taken away from another but only influenced by word and example. In this way, she argues, Locke seeks to separate religion from the pursuit of earthly goods, from embodied identities and coercive power and put it into circulation as a matter of preference and public persuasion. Indeed, Locke enjoins ecclesiastical authorities to exhort their co-religionists to the duties of 'charity, meekness and toleration' to all (Locke 1983, 34).

In this way, there is a clear concern in the Letter to reconfigure religion such that it will not give rise to anything which might interrupt or disturb the pursuit of earthly goods and flourishing in bodily health and private property. For that is the danger which Locke's strict delineation of the responsibilities of the magistrate for civil matters and his advocacy that the magistrate and religious societies should tolerate differences in religion aims to avert. The use of coercive power to enforce certain religious beliefs and practices and ban others is destructive of the peaceful pursuit of all that makes for that preservation to which all have a right. Such invasion of civil rights through religious persecution is 'a pernicious… Seed of Discord and War', a "powerful provocation to endless Hatreds, Rapines, and Slaughters" (Locke 1983, 32). Indeed, where dominion is founded on grace and religion is propagated by arms, there can be no peace and security (Locke 1983, 33). The only limits of toleration are where religious views undermine the basis for that peace and security: those holding that the bonds which hold society together are dissoluble on religious grounds; the person whose religion binds them in loyalty to a foreign power (a transnational connection); and the person who denies the divine donator of the rights of humans to life and property (the atheist) (Locke 1983, 49-51).

In part, Locke's account rests on the incompatibility of coercion with true religion. True religion cannot be coercive because it is a matter of inner conviction. It consists 'in the inward persuasion of the mind' which cannot be compelled to belief by external force and indeed is subverted by coercion (Locke 1983, 26-7, 38). Hence it is not really religion that is responsible for conflict, but the refusal of toleration motivated by avarice and lust for power (1983, 53-55). Locke also appeals to uncertainty regarding the religious matters about which religious groups disagree and wherein the magistrate has no more epistemic privilege than anyone else (1983, 36-7). (Owen connects this argument to Locke's account of faith and reason in the *Essay on Human Understanding* (2014, 68-80).)

Locke's argument also rests on a positive account of authentic religion, however, and of authentic Christianity in particular. Toleration, he announces, is 'the chief characteristical mark of the True Church' (Locke 1983, 23). For true Christianity is characterized by 'charity, meekness, and goodwill in general towards all Mankind' (1983, 23). Jesus' method of proselytizing, moreover, is to preach the gospel and show it forth by his exemplary holiness, not resort to the sword. (1983, 25).

As many scholars have pointed out, Locke's account of toleration rests on theological grounds which seem to restrict its applicability to secular and highly pluralistic societies. Nevertheless, its considerable homology with the British government's approach to shaping religious identities makes it analytically useful. For Locke offers an account of religion shaped around values very similar to many of those to which the government takes adherence as its yardstick of a community's integration into British society. He makes the case for an account of religion, and of Christianity in particular, where authentic religion does not interfere in the divinely ordained priority and inviolability of the pursuit of individual life, liberty, health and property within a society ordered to the preservation of the same. Indeed, he goes so far as to define the essence of religion in terms of a value whose meaning encapsulates the others: toleration as the separation of the magistrate's coercive power from religious matters (except in the case of those who deny the basis for rights to life and property

on religious grounds and those who owe religious loyalties to states other than the one which upholds those rights).

Hans Frei on Locke, biblical narrative and Christian political contribution to western society

John Locke thus exemplifies the political dimension of a tendency in modern theology of which the Yale historian and theologian Hans W. Frei was a persistent critic. The consistent objects of Frei's concern were modern theologians who sought to commend the meaningfulness or credibility of Christianity by interpreting its central claims in terms of, or in positive, systematic correlation with, a putatively general account of human religiosity. His complaint was that such endeavors subverted the meaning of those core claims, as grounded the narrative structure of certain biblical stories privileged in Christian tradition. This problem was political insofar as the structure of those stories supplies the basic framework for the various ways in which Christians imagine the world they inhabit, understand their place in it, interpret their experiences of it and orient their actions accordingly – including, we may infer, their participation in society.

Locke occurs in the work for which Frei is best known, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative*. There Frei traces the breakdown of the pre-modern practice of reading realistic biblical narratives literally and figurally. By 'realistic' he has in mind stories in the Old Testament and the synoptic gospels whose meaning is a matter of the way they depict the events with which they have to do – their 'narrative shape', including the device of chronological sequence – and in which characters are 'firmly and significantly set' in their natural and social contexts so that characters are depicted in relation to their circumstances and vice versa, in ordinary language (Frei 1974, 13-15). Such stories were thus 'history-like' and where read literally – attending to this realistic meaning – they were taken also to describe actual historical occurrences (1974, 2). Linked together in sequence as one story, where Old Testament stories were taken as figures fulfilled in New Testament stories, these stories were taken to depict a single history, that of the real world, which embraced the experience of every reader (1974, 2-3). Readers were to see the shape of their lives and of contemporary events, their dispositions, actions and sufferings, as figures of this world (1974, 3). This practice fostered a sense of the providential governance of God mysteriously at work in readers' lives and the wider world to which they belonged, for to see oneself and one's circumstances as figures of the biblical world was to perceive a unity in the divine plan in the correspondences between the shape of one's life and wider history and biblical meaning-patterns (1974, 28-9). It was to see these things as figures in the providential narrative (174, 153). The composite biblical story changed with changing interpretations, and figural interpretation was a delicate affair, but the story performed this function until the advent of modernity (1974, 3-4).

This way of approaching biblical narratives – and of imagining the world and oneself in it – began to come apart in the seventeenth century and broke down increasingly rapidly in the eighteenth. What drove its collapse was a shift in sensibility in which biblical stories no longer mediated access to the shape of history. Instead, biblical narratives were seen as logically distinct from the historical events they depict, which are also accessible in other ways, raising questions about the relationship between the stories and those (1974, 4-6). The meaning of the stories came to be understood in terms, therefore, of their ostensive reference or failure to refer to historical actualities. In this way, the finding of figural connections between stories or between stories and contemporary experience became less and less plausible (1974, 6-7). Frei mentions Locke both as an example of someone whose exegesis illustrates this shift (1974, 6) and whose understanding of linguistic meaning in terms of reference to independent reality via the author's thought and sense perception provided the

basis for the arguments of his friend, Anthony Collins, against the reference of Old Testament prophecy to Jesus Christ (1974, 75-78). Scriptural meaning for Locke and Collins was a matter of verbal propositions describing a single external state of affairs or the workings of the mind, which obey the same rules as all language, and make sense in the way other language does: in relation to what we can already know with our own reason (1974, 81-84). Locke is also for Frei the first apologetic theologian, seeking in his *On the Reasonableness of Christianity* to argue 'the intelligibility of [Christianity's] way of discoursing, the importance of its concerns for the life of mankind at large, and the meaningfulness of its real truth claims' (1974, 117). He was one of those who maintained both that the historicity of biblical events as the basis of the Bible's religious content *and* that its religious meaning or truth depended on a broader religious content beyond its particular claims (1974, 118, 125). In maintaining that the meaning of biblical narrative was propositional and referential, and that their meaningfulness had to do with its relationship to general accounts of human moral and religious experience, Locke typifies an influential tradition in modern theology (1974, 128).

What this tradition failed to do, Frei argues, was pay attention to the narrative meaning of these texts in its own right, as the story of salvation in which the narrative rendering of Jesus as Messiah is a core ingredient, quite apart from the question of whether he was in fact, or whether the claim was still meaningful. It failed to do so because of this apologetic concern to harmonize the stories' meaning with their meaningfulness (1974, 133-34). In other words, this tradition was unable to pay attention to that which was basic to pre-modern Christian practice and to a pre-modern Christian sensibility, however varied the forms these might take, and to the central figure in Christian tradition, Jesus Christ as portrayed in the gospel stories.

This elision is the condition of possibility of Locke's account of Christianity in *The Letter*. There is a brief, general claim about a portion of Jesus' story – his ministry – which is mainly negative in force: he did not use coercion. There is a brief appeal to love for all as the basis of the claim that the essence of Christianity is tolerance as Locke defines it. But the story of Jesus Christ with its narrative structure has no bearing on Locke's account of Christianity or toleration. Locke's propositional view of the gospel stories is not to the fore in his account of toleration (though the appeal to Jesus' ministry is consistent with it), but his apologetic method is. For Locke's claim that Christianity is essentially toleration expresses the meaningfulness of the Christian story in relation to the prior conclusions to Locke's natural law argument for individual rights to life, liberty, health and property.

At stake in this eclipse of biblical narrative, on Frei's account, is the political contribution of Christian community to modern western culture. In the 1980s, Frei re-thought the terms of his critique and its constructive implications, as a question of what kind of theology, and what kind of relationship between theology and other disciplines (philosophy, social science) would be most hospitable to the basic Christian practice of attention to the Jesus depicted in the gospel narratives, which he called 'the literal sense'. In this context, Frei urged that Christianity had much to gain in respect of its own reading practices by learning from Judaism and Midrash (1993b, 148-9). Such a renewal of Christianity's relationship with Judaism might also help Christianity recover its vocation as a religion after the demise of its role in western Christendom. For the literal sense could be expected to play a significant part in the contribution of Christian community to western culture or its residues, 'including its political life, its quest for justice and freedom…' (1993b, 149). In what ways might what Frei now called 'literal reading' might be significant for the political contribution of Christian community after Christendom?

At the heart of Locke's notion of toleration, and hence of his notion of Christianity and of religion in general is the separation of religion as a matter of inward conviction and public persuasion from the earthly goods which go into the preservation of self and others, including property, the rights we have to them and the obligation to punish or destroy those who invade

those rights, which the state assumes for us. On Frei's account of pre-modern literal and figural reading of biblical narrative, however, that distinction does not obtain, for the readers of biblical narrative are, like biblical characters, thoroughly integrated in their social setting. As figures of the biblical world, they make sense of their lives and circumstances as ingredients in a providential story, and fit themselves into it by their actions. Such religion is thus much more than inward persuasion; it has to do with the whole shape of one's life and that of the history of which one is a part.

There is here a kind of Christian secular sensibility both more secular and more resilient than Locke's natural law account of human rights. It is more resilient in its eschewal of reliance upon arguments for the existence and intentions of God that no longer seem like the obvious teachings of a universal rationality, and in relying instead upon the vitality of Christian practice which has endured through all kinds of shifts of conceptuality. The dignity of human beings as figures of God's saving history rests on their inclusion in the story of salvation as social beings belonging in particular circumstances, and (we might infer by extension) particular places, and not in contrast to their natural environment. It does not rest on anything inherent in them, like Locke's notion of self-ownership, or which sacralizes their capacities, as Locke sacralizes human property-making by an implied analogy between the divine labor of creation (realizing human beings as God's property) and human's mixing their labor with non-human things and so raising the self-owning property-maker to the level of demiurges with the right to confect exclusive ownership from nature's abundant yet placeless extensity in the endless and unqualified pursuit of their self-preservation. In this sense, it is a more secular vision than Locke's.

Because the story of salvation centered upon the stories of Jesus takes priority on Frei's approach, it allows for a sense of providence shaped by that story that has political significance. In Frei's *The Identity of Jesus Christ* (1975) he argues for an account of providence and a practice of reading clues in history which – without investing history with any inherent telos – discerns imperfect figures of redemption, reconciliation and resurrection in a history constituted by the interaction of church and the events, collectivities and institutions of the world (Frei 1975, 157-164; 1993b, 231). Frei certainly argued for such a vision, his ethic of patterning one's life after the shape of Jesus' obedient love for neighbor must be seen in the context of the hope and breadth of finite responsibility. On such a basis, he affirmed the affinity of the gospel of God's universal providential governance and a 'carefully circumscribed progressive politics' and called for a public theology that would speak from such a perspective to urge America away from exceptionalism and the anxieties of global power to a modest international role among other nations, a humanitarianism 'modified by Christian hope' (1993c, 231).

Frei does not attempt to commend the Christian practice of the literal sense, or the providential imagination which it can foster, or the politics that such an imagination might inform, by appeal to the canons of a universal rationality. He was highly skeptical about the possibility or wisdom of a natural theology and about the capacity of general theories adequately to explain particular characteristics of various religious practices. Christian literal readings are warranted, he argues, by agreement with the community's rules for reading the sacred text (1993b, 144). These rules – which amount to a minimal, flexible consensus – are in turn grounded in the community's experience of living with the text (1993a, 104). Yet these practices, and the meanings of Christian literal readings of biblical stories and Christian figural construals of the world which inform them, are not private or esoteric. While general explanatory theories serve them badly, they may be described as coherent systems of meaning, adapting concepts in wider circulation on an ad hoc basis (1993b, 143-147). Particular practices or construals may thus be made public and opened to challenge on both internal and external grounds.

Religious particularity and civic and democratic participation

This analysis of Frei's critique of Locke and its political significance raises a question about attempts by the state (and other agencies) to further the civic and democratic participation of religious communities while attempting to discipline religious communities into espousing moderate identities which are defined by no more than their renunciation of radicalism and their adherence to a limited set of values. The *Prevent Strategy* is right to value the participation of religious communities in civic society and democratic processes. There is a good deal of scholarship that demonstrates that religious communities can make significant contributions to the renewal of civic society and making powerful institutions more democratic accountability (e.g. Bretherton 2015; Marsh 2005; Stout 2010). My analysis of Locke and Frei raises the troubling possibility that the moderating of religious identities might foster forms of 'moderate' discourse in which the concern to demonstrate relevance and conformity to the norms of moderate religion articulated by the state and others might lead to the eclipse of those core aspects of their traditions which might otherwise resource a richer, more resilient and creative constructive contribution to civil society and democratic practice, one which comes from the heart of their religious identity.

Frei's own social ethics is not necessarily representative of the discipline of Christian social ethics in either North America or Britain. Nor can one necessarily read across from the academic discipline to the theological discourses of Christian communities who are constructively engaged in civil society and local or national democratic practices. Nor do all Christian communities seek to engage in these ways or see such engagement as consistent with their Christian identity. Yet it is not implausible to think that he has identified some conditions of possibility of what makes for a richly creative, constructive and resilient contribution to civil society and democratic practice in the case of Christianity, conditions which support a variety of different approaches and a healthy debate among them.

While Frei himself identified an analogue to the literal sense in Jewish Midrash, we cannot assume that all religious traditions are like Christianity in some degree or other, or that comparison with Christianity or Judaism is the most helpful way to interpret them. Yet with considerable caution, we could attempt to widen the cautionary point I am trying to make. Frei articulates and connects two issues whose pertinence for religious communities in secular, pluralistic contexts may not be limited to Judaism and Christianity. First, can one identity a source in its practices of the identity of a religious tradition through all its changes? Second, to the extent that the tradition's source of identity orients the community toward constructive engagement with society, what forms of conceptual self-description – intelligible beyond the community – will best foster the community's vocation in a society where it will not expect to supply that society's ideological basis and coherence? If we grant that those questions are useful and cogent, then I think we can also see how the dangers of moderating religion Frei identifies with respect to Christianity in the modern West might well be echoed in respect of other religious communities in the same context. For Frei's analysis suggests that we be open to the possibility that it is when a religious community is most radical – by returning to renew itself from its roots – that it may have most to offer to a pluralistic, secular society.

By framing authentic religious identity, and denoting this authentic identity as religiously moderate over against religiously radical, the state pressures religious communities to moderate the particularities and complexities of their traditions in order to present their conformity to liberal democracy and values. Such domestication may well subvert the capacities of religious communities and individuals to draw creatively on the resources of their traditions in order to participate constructively in political life in ways that we might not

anticipate. For the attempt to moderate religious communities' identities in terms of compatibility with liberal democracy and values in rhetoric and public policy has a defensive posture. It casts liberal democracy as something essentially given and fixed, rather than as an evolving project receptive to diverse contributions. The energies of government and state-regulated institutions might better be directed away from the 'moderation' of religious identity to the task of configuring public institutions, civil organizations and democratic forms so as to be most hospitable to 'radical' religious contributions and the public exposition of what Nick Adams (2006) calls the 'deep reasonings' that inform them.

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1 Haddad & Golson document a longer history to this development, going back to the growing tensions between Muslims and so-called 'indigenous' Europeans in the 1980s and 1990s, catalysed by public protests by Muslims over the US bombing of Libya in 1984, the Rushdie Affair in Britain in 1989 and the headscarf affairs in France in 1989 and 2004, and the integrative policies which sought to address the 'Muslim problem' (pp. 489-494). Ironically, these policies which for a long time encouraged Muslim communities to rely financially and spiritually on transnational networks in order to encourage the repatriation of Muslim immigrants. The negative state and public reaction to public protest by Muslims over what they saw as their right to religious expression over these issues resulted in 'mutual distrust and misunderstanding' (2007: 492).

2 The Review recognised that Prevent had securitised the government's integration strategy and should not, and that it had in effect drawn distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable kinds of faith (pp. 3 and 6). The document still evinces signs of the same goal, however – the moderation of British Muslim identity – and distinguishes between legitimate religious beliefs and extremist ideologies which oppose universal human rights, equality before the law, democracy and full participation in society (p. 1). This followed a series of critical reviews culminating in the report on Prevent by the House of Commons Select Committing on Preventing Violent Extremism in March 2010, whose criticisms the Review reflect. On that report and its criticisms, see J. Bartlett and J. Birdwell, *From Suspects to Citizens: preventing violent extremism in a Big Society*, 2010.